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Abstract
David Chalmers has defended an account of what it is for a physical system to imple-
ment a computation. The account appeals to the idea of a “combinatorial-state automaton”
or CSA. It is not entirely clear whether Chalmers intends the CSA to be a full-blown com-
putational model, or merely a convenient formalism into which instances of other models
can be translated. I argue that the CSA is not a computational model in the usual sense
because CSAs do not perspicuously represent algorithms, and because they are too pow-
erful both in that they can perform any computation in a single step and in that without so
far unspecified restrictions they can “compute” the uncomputable. In addition, I suggest
that finite, inputless CSAs have trivial implementations very similar to those they were
introduced to avoid.
keywords: Combinatorial-state automaton, computational model, implementation, Tur-
ing machine
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1 Introduction
It is a commonly held view in the cognitive sciences that cognition is essentially computation.
If this idea is to be explanatorily useful, however, there must be an objective account of when
a physical process implements a particular computation. Philosophers such as Hilary Putnam
(1988) and John R. Searle (1991) have questioned whether such an account is possible. Searle
and Putnam have both claimed that, on a standard understanding of implementation, any rea-
sonably complex physical system implements virtually any computation.1 Chalmers’s account
of implementation is specifically intended to refute such claims.
I will argue first that the abstract conception of computation that Chalmers introduces,
the combinatorial-state automaton or CSA, cannot be regarded as a full-blown computational
model. Although Chalmers may well never have intended it to be regarded in this way, it would
provide a more satisfying foundation for an account of implementation if it truly were a general
model of computation. I will also argue, second, that the account of implementation in terms of
CSAs does in fact allow for trivial implementations similar to those it was introduced to avoid.
2 Chalmers on Implementation
2.1 Implementation of Finite-State Automata
Let us begin with Chalmers’s definition of implementation for a finite-state automaton, or FSA.
An FSA with input and output has the following characteristics: A set of internal states S, one
of which is the “start state”; a set of inputs I; a set of outputs O; and a function from pairs of
an input and an internal state to another internal state and an output.2 Chalmers writes:
1Searle writes: “For any program and any sufficiently complex object, there is some description of the object
under which it is implementing the program. Thus for example the wall behind my back is right now implementing
the Wordstar program, because there is some pattern of molecule movements that is isomorphic with the formal
structure of Wordstar” (Searle 1991, pp. 208-209).
2Sometimes this is treated as a pair of functions, one from pairs of an input state and an internal state to the
succeeding internal state, and one from internal states to outputs.
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A physical system P implements an FSA M if there is a mapping f that maps
internal states of P to internal states of M , inputs to P to input states of M , and
outputs of P to output states of M , such that: for every state-transition relation
(S; I) ! (S 0; O0) of M , the following conditional holds: if P is in internal state s
and receiving input i where f(s) = S and f(i) = I , this reliably causes it to enter
internal state s0 and produce output o0 such that f(s0) = S 0 and f(o) = O0.
The state-transition function for an FSA determines how the FSA moves from state to state.
This definition of implementation requires the corresponding transitions from physical state to
physical state in the physical system to be reliably caused. This means not only that a given state
does cause the relevant next state every time it occurs, but also that, even if a state never actually
occurs, it would cause the appropriate next state if it were to occur. By requiring this sort of
reliable causation between physical states, Chalmers’s definition of implementation constrains
physical implementations more tightly than Putnam’s does, and in a clearly appropriate way.
However, Chalmers shows in detail that a more restricted version of Putnam’s and Searle’s
conclusion can still be established. I will consider Chalmers’s discussion of this point in the
special case of a finite-state automaton without input or output, in part because this is the
simplest case and in part because I will make use of this result in my criticism of Chalmers’s
own model.
In the case of an FSA without input or output, the state-transition function is simply a
function from states to states. Chalmers shows that for any suitably complex physical system
that satisfies two simple conditions, we can find a mapping function from states of the physical
system to states of the FSA such that the causal relations between the physical states mirror the
formal relations between the abstract states of the FSA. The first condition is that the physical
system must include what Chalmers calls a “clock.” By this he means simply that a part of
the physical system changes reliably from state to state in a non-repeating way, so that each
total state of the physical system causes the succeeding state, and no later state is identical with
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any earlier state. The second condition is that the system has what Chalmers calls a “dial,”
which simply means that the system has a component that can be in many different states such
that when the dial is in a particular state it tends to remain in that state, and the dial states do
not affect the operation of the clock. This could be a literal dial or counter (unconnected to
anything else), or we could simply treat a system as including marks we could draw on it, for
example tally marks.
Suppose we nowwant to construct a physical implementation of the following simple FSA.3
1
2
34
5
For vividness, our implementation will consist of an actual digital clock with a manually ad-
justable dial attached to the top. We will set the dial to 1, start the clock at 12:00, and let it
run for a few minutes. (For simplicity I assume that time progresses digitally in one-minute
increments.) We obtain the following sequence of total physical states of our clock-dial com-
bination:
12:00, 1 12:01, 1 12:02, 1 12:03, 1
Now, we also know that, if we had set the dial to 2 or 3 instead of 1, the system would have
gone through a sequence of states exactly the same as the sequence it did go through, except
for the dial setting. So we also have the following counterfactual dependencies:
3To give us something other than a simple straight-line FSA, I have allowed the FSA to have multiple starting
states.
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12:00, 3 12:01, 3 12:02, 3 12:03, 3
12:00, 2 12:01, 2 12:02, 2 12:03, 2
We can now apply Chalmers’s strategy for constructing a trivial implementation as follows.
We will associate each state of the FSA with a set of physical states. We begin with the starting
state of the actual run of our physical system, namely the state [12:00, 1], and one of the starting
states of our FSA, let’s say state 1. We associate abstract state 1 with physical state [12:00, 1].
According to the state transition function for the FSA, state 1 is followed by state 2, while in
the physical system, state [12:00, 1] is followed by state [12:01, 1]. So state 2 is associated
with [12:01, 1] and state 3 with [12:03, 1]. We still do not have physical states associated with
FSA states 4 or 5. But we want the physical system to have possible states corresponding to
these abstract states, and we want counterfactual causal dependencies in the physical system to
correspond to the paths through the FSA starting with states 4 or 5. So we next consider what
would have happened if the dial had been set to 2. We associate abstract state 4 with physical
state [12:00, 2]. Abstract state 4 is followed by state 2, and physical state [12:00, 2] is followed
by physical state [12:01, 2], so we need to associate state 2 with [12:01, 2]. State 2 now has two
associated physical states: [12:01, 1] and [12:01, 2]. Moreover, as before, state 2 is followed by
state 3, so we need to associate state 3 with [12:02, 2]. This second path through the FSA still
has left us without a physical state to associate with starting state 5, which leads to state 3, so
we associate 5 with [12:00, 3] and 3 with [12:01, 3]. We now have the following associations:
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abstract state physical states
1 f[12:00, 1]g
2 f[12:01, 1], [12:01, 2]g
3 f[12:02, 1], [12:02, 2], [12:01, 3]g
4 f[12:00, 2]g
5 f[12:00, 3]g
The mapping f from physical states to abstract states thus determined is many-to-one, since
e.g. f([12:02,1]) = f([12:02,2]) = f([12:01,3]). We could simply leave matters like this,
but it is natural to take a further step. Let R(s; s0) be the relation physical state s bears to
physical state s0 if and only if f(s) = f(s0). Clearly R is an equivalence relation, and we
can regard the equivalence class [s]R as a more abstract physical state type: the state type that
the system is in if and only if it is in any one of the more specific states in the equivalence
class. This is what Chalmers means when he discusses “a grouping of physical states of the
system into state-types” (Chalmers 2011, p. 328), and it is clearly these “grouped state-types”
he has in mind when he writes that “the relation between an implemented computation and an
implementing system is one of isomorphism between the formal structure of the former and the
causal structure of the latter” (Chalmers 2011, p. 333).
Given the mapping from physical states to abstract ones, the clock-and-dial physical system
meets Chalmers’s criterion for being an implementation of the FSA with which we began.
2.2 Combinatorial-State Automata
It seems obvious that something has gone wrong; it should not be this easy for a physical sys-
tem to implement a computation. But what exactly is the problem? Chalmers’s suggestion is
that an inputless FSA is too simple to provide a model of the kind of computation that underlies
cognition. He points out that an FSA with input and output will be somewhat more difficult to
implement, but shows that implementations will still be easier to come by than one would like.
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Again his conclusion is that the model is too simple and unstructured. Chalmers writes: “The
real moral . . . is that even simple FSAs with inputs and outputs are not constrained enough
to capture the kind of complex structure that computation and cognition involve. The trouble
is that the internal states of these FSAs are monadic, lacking any internal structure, whereas
the internal states of most computational and cognitive systems have all sorts of complex struc-
ture” (Chalmers 1996a, p. 324). Chalmers then introduces a model to attempt to capture this
internal structure, the model of the “combinatorial-state automaton,” or CSA. The CSA can be
described in exactly the same way as an FSA, except that all input states, internal states, and
output states are described as vectors rather than structureless states; that is, each state is re-
garded as having substates. A given internal state S will be viewed as a vector [S1; S2; : : : Sn],
and similarly for input and output states.4 And the account of implementation is also a straight-
forward generalization of that for FSAs: for a physical system to implement a CSA, it must
have states with substates that map to substates of the CSA, and state-transition rules in the
CSA must correspond to reliable causal dependencies in the physical system. More precisely,
to again quote Chalmers,
A physical system P implements a CSA M if there is a vectorization of internal
states of P into components [s1; s2; : : :], and a mapping f from the substates sj into
corresponding substates Sj ofM , along with similar vectorizations and mappings
for inputs and outputs, such that for every state-transition rule ([I1; : : : Ik]; [S1; S2; : : :])  !
([S 01; S 02; : : :]; [O1; : : : ; Ol]) ofM : if P is in internal state [s1; s2; : : :] and receiving
input [i1; : : : ; ik] which map to formal state and input [S1; S2; : : :] and [I1; : : : ; Ik]
respectively, this reliably causes it to enter an internal state and produce an output
that map to [S 01; S 0n; : : :] and [O1; : : : ; Ol] respectively (Chalmers 2011, p. 331,
one small typo corrected).
4To capture the full power of a Turing machine, the internal states must be allowed to have infinitely many
components, but Chalmers considers primarily the finite case.
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Chalmers offers this as a general account of implementation: any abstract computation can
be redescribed in terms of CSA state-transitions, so that the above definition of implementation
can be applied to any abstract computation whatsoever. Moreover, he argues that the newmodel
avoids the triviality proofs for implementations of finite-state automata.
3 Against the CSA as a Computational Model
There are two ways one might interpret the CSA model. First, it could be intended to be a
general model of computation, in the same way that Turing machines or register machines are
models of computation. Second, it could be intended, not as a computational model in its own
right, but as a convenient formalism for redescribing computations from a variety of specific
models, in order to be able to state conditions on implementation in a way that will apply to all
of them. I will argue that the CSA cannot play the former role, and that, although it may be
able to serve the latter, more modest role, this may not be as advantageous as it first appears.
In many ways the former interpretation of the CSA, as a full-fledged computational model,
is a very attractive one. There have been many proposals for making the abstract idea of a
computation precise, including Turing machines, register machines, abacus machines, Post
production systems, and more. All of these have turned out to be equivalent, in the sense that
they can compute exactly the same functions. In another sense, though, they are not equiva-
lent: although a Turing machine and a register machine can each compute, say, f(x) = x!, the
procedures used to compute the function will be quite different in the two cases. Each specific
model of computation suggests a fairly restrictive physical implementation; for example, a Tur-
ing machine is thought of as having a read/write head that travels back and forth on a tape that
is divided into squares. The idea of a CSA could be seen as abstracting away from such details,
offering a completely general account of computation that is not restricted to any particular
kind of physical implementation. On this interpretation, the CSA would have two important
characteristics: (a) it would respect the differences between different computational models:
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the CSA transcription of a TM that computes a given function will be different from the CSA
transcription of a register machine that computes the same function. But, unlike the familiar
models, (b) it would be general enough to encompass them all. A TM cannot in any natural
way be represented as a register machine (although it can be simulated by one), but either can
be represented as a CSA. So the CSA seems to provide an attractive way of expressing the core
of computation without commitment to any specific kind of physical implementation.
Models of computation typically have two aspects. First, there is an intuitive picture of the
essential features of computing, which includes an account of the basic capacities and activities
involved in carrying out a computation. These are quite different from one model to the next:
the basic capacities in the Turing machine model involve such activities as writing or erasing a
symbol and moving to the right or left; the Markov model involves basic activities such as pat-
tern matching and substitution, and so on. Second, the intuitive picture guides the construction
of a formal mathematical model. These are quite different from one computational model to
the next, but each of them construes a model as a kind of set-theoretic construction, a sequence
of parameters whose values must satisfy certain constraints.5 The CSA certainly counts as a
model in the sense of a set-theoretic construction. But there is no intuitive conception of com-
putation underlying it. As a result, I will suggest in section 3.1, it does not offer a perspicuous
way of explaining or understanding computations. The lack of an intuitive picture underlying
the set-theoretic construction may also be the reason that the constraints placed on the model
do not yet rule out “computing” the uncomputable, as I will suggest in section 3.2.
3.1 First Problem: Lack of Perspicuity
If we consider how to translate a TM description into a CSA description, we may begin to
wonder whether something has gone wrong. Consider the following very simple two-state
5I am drawing here on R. Gregory Taylor’s helpful section “What is a Model of Computation?” (Taylor 1998,
pp. 342-344). Taylor suggests that the existing models of computation are so varied that there is no core of
essential features common to them all: “the most that can be said is that the various models . . . exhibit certain
family resemblances” (Taylor 1998, p. 344).
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Turing machine. If started on the leftmost of a string of 0 or more 1’s, it will move to the
right, add a 1, and then move back to the left to halt on the first blank space before the 1’s. We
could think of it as computing the function f(n) = n + 1. (For simplicity I ignore the usual
convention that the head must halt on the leftmost stroke of the resulting block.)
1
1:R
2
B:1
1:L
How should this Turing machine be described in the CSA formalism? A state of the CSA
will be a vector with components for each square of the TM and a component for the internal
state of the TM. To keep things simple, let us restrict our TM to a tape with only three squares.
Each square will either be blank or contain a 1, and any combination of blanks and 1s will be
a possible state of the tape. This gives us eight possible states so far. States must also have a
component to represent the internal state of the TM; since our TM has two possible internal
states, we now have 8 2 = 16 states. Finally, a CSA state needs to indicate the position of the
TM’s read/write head. The head must be on one and only one square of the tape, so we have a
grand total of 16 3 = 48 distinct states the CSA can be in.6
In the general case, CSAs may have inputs and outputs as well as internal states. But this is
not required to represent a Turing machine. There is no output aside from the final state of the
tape. Chalmers suggests that the TM be regarded as having input only once, when it starts, but
we can equally well regard it as having no input at all if we treat every state as a starting state,
6The simplest way to represent the position of the head would be to add another component to the state vector
and use it to indicate the number of the square on which the head is located. But this would not work if we allowed
infinite vectors, which we need to fully represent a TM. Chalmers suggests letting the components for squares of
the tape be ordered pairs of a symbol and a yes/no value indicating whether the head is on the square. If we do this
we need to add a restriction specifying that only one square can have the value “yes.” In my state-transition table
below I depict the position of the head pictorially without worrying about the precise set-theoretic representation
of this information.
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since the input is also simply a distribution of symbols on the tape.
Finally, in addition to state vectors (and input and output vectors if necessary), a CSA
must have a state-transition function. Since we do not need inputs and outputs for our TM
representation, we can regard this function as simply a function from state vectors to state
vectors. A function is simply a set of ordered pairs, so the most obvious way to represent
such a function is to list every such pair. Equivalently, we can regard each ordered pair as a
state-transition rule stating that its first member must be followed by its second member. Call
a description of a CSA by means of such a complete list an exhaustive listing. In the present
case we will have 48 such rules, one for each state of the CSA. Table 1 is the exhaustive listing
for the Turing machine we are discussing.
The first thing to notice about this listing is that it seems rather long as a way of character-
izing a Turing machine that we could describe very briefly and simply! And of course this is
the description for a machine with a tape only three squares long; every additional square of
tape will double the number of possible states, so that to represent a machine with a tape of,
say, 1000 squares, we will need more than 21000 states, or around 10300, and the same number
of state-transition rules in an exhaustive listing.
Another way to get a visual impression of the decrease in perspicuity that results from
redescription as a CSA is to consider a state-transition diagram. Notice that our CSA transcrip-
tion of the simple Turing machine has absorbed the Turing machine’s tape into its internal state,
so that the CSA has no input or output.7 But this means that in a sense the CSA just is a giant
inputless FSA. We can give the same sort of state-transition diagram for the CSA that we can
for an FSA, treating the vectors that constitute the internal states as a way of labeling states of
the FSA. The state-transition diagram of the machine we are considering consists of a number
of non-intersecting diagrams. Many of these are one- or two-state dead ends; these are shown
7We saw earlier that we do not even need input at the first step if we regard the CSA as having multiple starting
states.
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Table 1: CSA Transcription of Simple Turing Machine
[ 1 1 1 1 ]  ! [ 1 1 1 1 ]
[ B 1 1 1 ]  ! [ 1 1 1 2 ]
[ 1 1 B 1 ]  ! [ 1 1 B 1 ]
[ B 1 B 1 ]  ! [ 1 1 B 2 ]
[ 1 B 1 1 ]  ! [ 1 B 1 1 ]
[ B B 1 1 ]  ! [ 1 B 1 2 ]
[ 1 B B 1 ]  ! [ 1 B B 1 ]
[ B B B 1 ]  ! [ 1 B B 2 ]
[ 1 1 1 2 ]  ! [ 1 1 1 2 ]
[ B 1 1 2 ]  ! [ B 1 1 2 ]
[ 1 1 B 2 ]  ! [ 1 1 B 2 ]
[ B 1 B 2 ]  ! [ B 1 B 2 ]
[ 1 B 1 2 ]  ! [ 1 B 1 2 ]
[ B B 1 2 ]  ! [ B B 1 2 ]
[ 1 B B 2 ]  ! [ 1 B B 2 ]
[ B B B 2 ]  ! [ B B B 2 ]
[ 1 1 1 1 ]  ! [ 1 1 1 1 ]
[ B 1 1 1 ]  ! [ B 1 1 1 ]
[ 1 1 B 1 ]  ! [ 1 1 B 1 ]
[ B 1 B 1 ]  ! [ B 1 B 1 ]
[ 1 B 1 1 ]  ! [ 1 1 1 2 ]
[ B B 1 1 ]  ! [ B 1 1 2 ]
[ 1 B B 1 ]  ! [ 1 1 B 2 ]
[ B B B 1 ]  ! [ B 1 B 2 ]
[ 1 1 1 2 ]  ! [ 1 1 1 2 ]
[ B 1 1 2 ]  ! [ B 1 1 2 ]
[ 1 1 B 2 ]  ! [ 1 1 B 2 ]
[ B 1 B 2 ]  ! [ B 1 B 2 ]
[ 1 B 1 2 ]  ! [ 1 B 1 2 ]
[ B B 1 2 ]  ! [ B B 1 2 ]
[ 1 B B 2 ]  ! [ 1 B B 2 ]
[ B B B 2 ]  ! [ B B B 2 ]
[ 1 1 1 1 ]  ! [ 1 1 1 1 ]
[ B 1 1 1 ]  ! [ B 1 1 1 ]
[ 1 1 B 1 ]  ! [ 1 1 1 2 ]
[ B 1 B 1 ]  ! [ B 1 1 2 ]
[ 1 B 1 1 ]  ! [ 1 B 1 1 ]
[ B B 1 1 ]  ! [ B B 1 1 ]
[ 1 B B 1 ]  ! [ 1 B 1 2 ]
[ B B B 1 ]  ! [ B B 1 2 ]
[ 1 1 1 2 ]  ! [ 1 1 1 2 ]
[ B 1 1 2 ]  ! [ B 1 1 2 ]
[ 1 1 B 2 ]  ! [ 1 1 B 2 ]
[ B 1 B 2 ]  ! [ B 1 B 2 ]
[ 1 B 1 2 ]  ! [ 1 B 1 2 ]
[ B B 1 2 ]  ! [ B B 1 2 ]
[ 1 B B 2 ]  ! [ 1 B B 2 ]
[ B B B 2 ]  ! [ B B B 2 ]
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in Figure 1.8 Figure 2 shows the rest of the diagram, with paths extending to as many as six
states.
Now, what is the significance of this example? Let us consider two cases, first the case of
a finite CSA such as the example we have been considering, and second, an infinite CSA that
represents the same TMwith an infinite tape. In the finite case it is tempting to say that the CSA
does not represent a general algorithm at all in the way that the TM does, because information
is actually lost in the redescription of a TM as a CSA. If you extend the tape of the TM, the
very same TM description will now characterize a machine that computes the same function
over a larger domain. But you cannot deduce from the state-transition function of a CSA how
it should behave if we add more substates to represent additional squares of tape. We could say
that the state-transition function of the CSA does not determine what mathematical function the
CSA is computing. We could try to find the simplest description of the general principles the
CSA is applying, and then use those general principles to project how the CSA should behave
if extended to represent a larger tape. But the state-transition function itself does not determine
this.
If we have an infinite CSA representing our TM with an infinite tape, then we will have
all the information we need to determine what mathematical function is being computed. In
this case, it may still be reasonable to say that the CSA does not represent an algorithm at all;
certainly it does not represent one perspicuously. The information about the TM algorithm
is present only in the same way that the laws of motion and gravitation would be present in
a complete description of all the possible trajectories of objects in the universe. We have a
complete listing of what the TM will do under every possible circumstance, but we have no
easy or automatic way to determine the general principles that underlie these actions.
8The node labels require some explanation. Each digit represents a separate component of the CSA state. The
first three digits represent the three squares on the tape. For these digits, ‘1’ means there is a one on the square and
the head is not in that position; ‘2’ means there is a one on the square and the head is positioned at that square; ‘5’
and ‘6’ represent a blank without and with the head, respectively.
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Figure 1: CSA Diagram, One- and Two-State Paths
5562
1562
1162
5521
1521
5121
5652
6552
6512
5211
6551 2552
6511 2512
5162
1652
14
Figure 2: CSA Diagram, Longer Paths
2111 1211
6111
2112
2151 1251
6151
2152
2511 1611
2551 1651
6112
6152
1121
1161
5251 5161
1212
5611
5212
1252
5651 5252
1612
5612
1122
5122
1561 1522
5561 5522
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A closely related way to look at the matter is to notice that a state of the CSA that de-
scribes the Turing machine represents what Turing called a “complete configuration” of the
machine, and what is now often called the state of a computation. The state transition rules
relate complete computational states, and taken as a whole they specify every possible course
the computation could take. So the state transition function in a sense gives us the results of
applying an algorithm rather than the algorithm itself.
3.2 Second Problem: Excessive Power
Without unspecified restrictions, CSAs are too powerful to count as a computational model.
There are at least two ways to see this point.
First, recall that Turing machines and other computational models were originally intro-
duced to try to provide a precise interpretation of the idea of an effective procedure or algorithm
for computing a function. Turing machines (and other models) have the following property: if
we can find a Turing machine that computes a given function, then we have found an effective
procedure for computing the function, and the TM description is a description of this proce-
dure. But this is simply not true for CSAs in general. There will always be a CSA which finds
the value of a function for any argument in some finite range in a single step. For instance, in
the case of the function f(x) = x + 1, which our simple Turing machine computes, we could
dispense with the component that lists the position of the TM head, keeping the n components
that represent squares of the tape and the component for the TM state. For every CSA state in
which the TM state component is 1 andm consecutive tape components contain ones while the
rest contain blanks, we will simply have a state-transition rule stating that the subsequent state
of the CSA hasm+ 1 ones on an otherwise blank tape and the TM-state component is 2. Thus
all the work is done in state 1; state 2 is simply a halting state. The resulting CSA is no longer a
Turing machine, since we have dispensed with the head and can change more than one square
of the tape at a time. But it still satisfies the definition of a CSA, even though what it is doing
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hardly seems to count as computation at all. (It amounts to looking up the answer in a lookup
table, except that the lookup table is stored in the state-transition rules rather than in memory.)
Second, consider the case of a CSA whose states have an infinite number of components.
Chalmers explicitly allows this, as indeed he must if it is to be possible to have a CSA tran-
scription of a TM with an infinite tape.9 But now the state-transition function will need to be
able to take infinitely many arguments (so that an exhaustive listing would have infinitely many
state-transition rules). But once we allow the state-transition function to have infinitely many
arguments, it is hard to see how to prevent CSAs from being able to “compute” functions that
are in fact not computable! And clearly a model that permits “computation” of uncomputable
functions is not a good candidate for a model of computation.10
I hesitate to place too much weight on this point, since Chalmers only briefly mentions infi-
nite CSAs, and he does state that “restrictions have to be placed on the vectors and dependency
rules, so that these do not encode an infinite amount of information” (Chalmers 2011, p. 330).
Chalmers does not state what these restrictions might be, however. Clearly one way to specify
such restrictions would be to require that the CSA conform to the limitations of a Turing ma-
chine: the only square that can change is the one the head is on, and the position of the head
can only change by one square at a time. But we certainly do not want to impose the constraints
specific to Turing machines on the general notion of a CSA, since this would deprive it of its
ability to transcribe computational models other than Turing machines.
In some ways the most natural way to limit the class of CSAs to those that compute func-
tions that are “computable” in the usual sense might be to require that there be a way to give a
finite specification of the state-transition function. More precisely, it would be natural to require
that the state-transition function be effectively computable. But this solution would seem to rob
9It is often pointed out that a TM tape need not actually be infinite, but may only be unbounded. But it won’t do
to simply give a CSA an unbounded number of states, since this would make the state-transition rules impossible
to specify. This is another symptom of the fact that TM rules are general in a way that CSA state-transition rules
need not be.
10A closely related observation is that without further restrictions, a diagonalization argument will show that
the CSA has nondenumerably many possible states.
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the CSA formalism itself of interest as a computational model, since the work of guaranteeing
that what the CSA is doing is computable would in fact be done by an independent conception
of computability.
The problem of excessive power can be put in another way. Traditional computational
models begin with a highly restricted set of abilities, and then show that more and more complex
tasks can be performed by combinations of these basic abilities. It is precisely the fact that
complex tasks can be accomplished by complex applications of simple abilities that shows that
the tasks are computable. However, the CSA model in a sense moves in the exact opposite
direction. It begins with the ability to move from absolutely any state to absolutely any other
state, so that to guarantee that only computable functions can be captured, we have to impose
restrictions.
3.3 Third Problem: Trivial Implementations
The principal advantage of the CSA over the FSA is intended to be that CSAs are not similarly
susceptible of trivial implementations, such as the implementations consisting of a clock and a
dial considered earlier. Of course, a finite CSA is equivalent to an FSA, as Chalmers himself
points out. In fact the state-transition diagram displayed earlier can be construed as that of
an inputless FSA. Chalmers’s own argument, reviewed earlier, shows that there is a trivial
implementation of this inputless FSA by means of a clock and a dial. However, as Chalmers
points out, “the implementation conditions on a CSA are much more constrained than those
of the corresponding FSA. An implementation of a CSA is required to consist in a complex
causal interaction among a number of separate parts; a CSA description can therefore capture
the causal organization of a system to a much finer grain” (Chalmers 2011, p. 331).
However, if we adopt Chalmers’s official definition of implementation for a CSA, without
any additional restrictions, it is possible to implement a finite, inputless CSA in a physical
system in which there is almost no causal interaction at all between the subcomponents of
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the system. Consider the following simple modification of Chalmers’s technique for finding
trivial FSA implementations. Instead of implementing the CSA with a single clock and dial,
we will implement a CSA whose states have n components by means of a physical system
containing n clocks and n dials. Each component of the overall physical system will include
three subcomponents. The first two are the dial and the clock; for each component i from 1
to n the third subcomponent is simply an indicator that displays the numeral i, to distinguish
the state of this particular component from that of the other components, which otherwise will
be exactly similar. All of the clocks and dials will be linked in such a way that it is physically
necessary that they have the same reading; having different readings on different clocks or
dials will be physically impossible. One way to achieve this for the clocks, assuming they are
sufficiently accurate, is to simply synchronize them before running the system. A crude way to
achieve it for the dials, if they were literal dials with a round face and a hand, would be to link
all n of the hands with a bar which keeps them synchronized. Obviously more sophisticated
means would also be possible. Since each clock-plus-dial-plus-indicator state reliably causes
its successor state (a state with the same dial reading, the same state-indicator reading, and an
incremented clock reading), it will also be true that each overall state of the n-clocks-dials-
and-indicators will reliably cause its successor. We first focus on total states of the physical
system, using Chalmers’s procedure described in section 2.1 to construct an equivalence class
of physical states to correspond to each overall CSA state.
This gives us physical implementations for total states of the CSA, but we have not yet
specified physical implementations for the individual components of those states. Indeed, it
may seem backward to find implementations of the total state first, since the total abstract state
is a vector of abstract substates, and we would like its physical implementation to similarly
be a vector of physical states. However, once we have the physical implementations of total
CSA states, we can easily construct the implementations of their substates. We can specify
the grouped physical state type which implements (maps to) Sij of CSA M , where this is a
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component that appears in many different total states ofM , as follows. For every possible total
state S of M , if the ith component of that state has value j, we find the equivalence class of
physical states [p] which corresponds to S. For each pk in this equivalence class, the physical
state of the ith component of pk is one of the physical states which map to Sij .
Of course, this mapping of physical states to substates of the CSA generates a lot of new
theoretical ways to physically implement a given CSA state. However, given the physical im-
possibility of the clock and dial settings of the physical substates differing from one another,
only a small number of the many theoretically possible implementations of a given total CSA
state will actually be physically possible. Indeed, every physical implementation of Sij (that
is, every state in the equivalence class which implements Sij) uniquely determines not only the
abstract state of the abstract component Si, but a total state of M , because knowing the clock
and dial readings of any physical component at a time suffices to determine the clock and dial
readings of all the other components at that time (since they are all required to be the same).
In some ways the basic idea here is similar to one that Chalmers considers (Chalmers 1996a,
p. 327). That strategy is to make the state of each component of an implementing system at a
time depend on the states of all of the components at the preceding time. Chalmers points out
that this strategy leads to a combinatorial explosion that would quickly require implementing
systems to become larger than the known universe. Despite the practical impossibility of such
trivial implementations, in the end Chalmers holds that additional (unspecified) constraints on
implementation are needed to rule them out (Chalmers 1996a, p. 329). If the trivial imple-
mentations proposed here do in fact meet Chalmers’s official definition of implementations of
CSAs, however, then the need for such additional constraints is even more pressing than he sug-
gests, since they would appear to be possible in systems that are not wildly large, and whose
histories are even more boringly uneventful than those of the systems he considers. It seems
quite clear that the physical systems involved are small enough and simple enough to be easily
constructed, and that they should not count as an implementations of interesting computations.
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What makes such trivial implementations possible is in part the fact that Chalmers’s official
definition of implementation appeals only to transition rules that link total states, not to more
local or general rules; and in part the fact that in the physical system I propose it is impossible
for the dial and clock readings of the various physical substates to differ from one another. One
might wonder whether this latter point somehow disqualifies the implementation. But there
doesn’t seem to be anything in the official definition of CSA implementation which rules out
this sort of causal connection between the physical substates of the overall system, and it is not
clear what constraint one might add to rule it out. There cannot be a general prohibition on
causal connections between subcomponents, since we want the various components of a TM
implementation, for example, to interact. Nor can there be a prohibition on causal connections
that are not required by the nature of the abstract machine being implemented; for instance, in a
crude physical implementation of a TM, there can surely be no objection to the read-write head
compressing the square of the tape it rests on, even though this is not required by the abstract
specification of the TM. We might wonder whether we should require that any of the physical
states that map to S11 should be combinable with any of the physical states that map to S
2
1 ,
and so on. But this seems far too strong a requirement. Perhaps we could implement a Turing
machine on a PC in such a way that the contents of the tape can be stored either in RAM or on
the hard drive. Then for every square there would be two ways to implement the state in which
the square contains a stroke. But it might be impossible to combine the first implementation of
square 1 containing a stroke with the second implementation of square 2 containing a stroke:
perhaps the contents of the entire tape must be stored in the same location.
My first two criticisms of the CSA model focused on the abstract model itself, emphasizing
the need for additional constraints on this abstract model. My guess is that the way to avoid
trivial implementations, however, is different. Chalmers describes the root idea of his account
of implementation as the idea that there is an isomorphism between “the formal structure” of
the abstract computation, and “the causal structure” of the physical system that implements it.11
11As Cocos (2002, p. 44) stresses, the definite description “the causal structure” is misleading, since (as
21
We normally think of implementation as a relation between abstract structures and concrete
physical processes. But of course isomorphism is a relation between abstract set-theoretic
structures. The “causal structure” of a physical system is still a set-theoretic structure, a set of
states or equivalence classes of states together with relations on those states. I wonder whether
the most difficult part of the relation between abstract computations and concrete processes
may turn out to be, not the relation between formal structures and causal structures, but rather
the relation between causal structures and concrete physical processes. I also wonder whether,
once an adequate account of when a physical system has a given causal structure has been
developed, it will rule out even the simple clock-dial implementations of FSAs with which we
began.
4 The CSA as a Transcription Device
I have argued that the CSA does not constitute a computational model in its own right, at
least as presently described. (It is possible that a revised version with restrictions imposed
on the allowable states and transitions might be.) It is entirely possible, however, that it was
not Chalmers’s intention to provide such an account. It may be that he intends the second
interpretation mentioned above, construing the CSA merely as a convenient formalism into
which more specific abstract machines can be translated.
If this were the case, then, since each TM state-transition rule (for instance) corresponds
to a large number of CSA state-transitions (in fact an infinite number if we are representing a
TM with an infinite tape), we could abandon the exhaustive listing as a way of characterizing a
CSA, and translate each TM rule by a universal quantification over CSA states. Some sentences
in “Rock” appear to suggest something like this: Chalmers mentions that “often the state-
transitions of a CSA will be defined in terms of local dependencies, as when a substate depends
only on a few neighboring substates and perhaps on a few inputs rather than on the entire
Chalmers recognizes) the same physical system will have many causal structures.
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previous state and input vectors,” and goes on to note that in such a case “we can require that the
appropriate restricted conditional holds: that is, if the physical system is in the (few) specified
previous substates and receiving the specified inputs, this causes it to transit appropriately”
(Chalmers 1996a, p. 325).
For the example we have been considering, we could say that the function that maps a state
S onto its successor S 0 is the unique function such that:
1. (8i : 1  i  n)((Si = `B’^Sn+1 = i^Sn+2 = 1)! (S 0i = `1’^S 0n+1 = i^S 0n+2 =
2))
2. (8i : 1  i < n)((Si = `1’ ^ Sn+1 = i ^ Sn+2 = 1)! (S 0n+1 = i+ 1 ^ S 0n+2 = 1))
3. (8i : 1 < i  n)((Si = `1’ ^ Sn+1 = i ^ Sn+2 = 2)! (S 0n+1 = i  1 ^ S 0n+2 = 2))
4. In all other respects, S 0 is identical to S.12
If we took this approach, then constructing informative descriptions of rules underlying
the state transition function would be straightforward, since they would simply transcribe the
general rules guiding the more specific abstract machine. We could be sure that we were con-
sidering only CSAs representing computable functions, since they would all be transcribed
from models which guarantee computability. But we would entirely lose the attractive idea of
the CSA as a model that represents the concept of computability in a completely general way.
Moreover, once we lose the idea that a physical system implements a computation if and
only if there is a CSA that implements it, it becomes less clear what the advantage of using
CSAs to define implementation is. For on this more limited understanding of the significance
of the CSA, we will need to decide how to translate each more specific computational model
into a CSA, a task which may prove to be just as difficult as defining implementation directly
for each specific model.
12n is the number of squares on the TM tape — three, in the case we have been considering. This description
treats the first n components of the state vector as representing the states of the tape’s n squares, the next compo-
nent as representing the index of the square the head is currently over, and the final component as representing the
current internal state of the TM.
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5 Conclusion
It would be satisfying to have a general account of computation, an account fine-grained enough
to distinguish between different kinds of implementation of computations of the same function,
and general enough that it can describe any abstract computation.13 It is possible that when
Chalmers provides details that were only hinted at in his earlier papers, in particular about the
restrictions that need to be placed on allowable CSA states, the CSA will in fact turn out to be
such a model. But it cannot yet be regarded in that light.14
13One proposed model of this sort is Yuri Gurevich’s Abstract State Machine: see e.g. Dershowitz and Gurevich
(2008).
14This paper is a revised and expanded descendant of “Implementation and Indeterminacy,” in J. Weckert and
Y. Al-Saggaf, eds., Conferences in Research and Practice in Information Technology, Vol. 37 (2004).
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